Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism

This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one’s true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities.

• 저널Management Science · 52(8) · 1215–1222
• 토픽Auction Theory and Applications · Management Science and Operations Research
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.1060.0528
• 저자Leon Yang Chu, Zuo‐Jun Max Shen