Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.

• 저널Management Science · 54(5) · 969–981
• 토픽Intellectual Property and Patents · Management of Technology and Innovation
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873
• 저자Derek J. Clark, Kai A. Konrad