A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quadratic voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make contributions to public goods of value to them. The amount received by the public good is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the “standard model,” this mechanism yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion, and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance and highlight directions for future analysis and experimentation. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

• 저널Management Science · 65(11) · 5171–5187
• 토픽Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Safety Research
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2019.3337
• 저자Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig, E. Glen Weyl