An Analysis of Scoring and Buyer‐Determined Procurement Auctions

In procurement auctions, the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). As the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non‐price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adjusted bids or scores , or, he can run a buyer‐determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price , and the buyer adjusts a certain number of the bids with the non‐price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. Unless the incumbent has a significant cost advantage over the entrants, I find that the scoring auction yields a lower average cost for the buyer, if the non‐price attributes are available. If the non‐price attributes are difficult or expensive to obtain, the buyer could run a buyer‐determined auction adjusting only the lowest price bid.

• 저널Production and Operations Management · 24(1) · 147–158
• 토픽Auction Theory and Applications · Management Science and Operations Research
• DOI10.1111/poms.12216
• 저자Natalia Santamaría