Profitability of the Name-Your-Own-Price Channel in the Case of Risk-Averse Buyers

In this paper, I study profitability of the name-your-own-price channel (NYOP) in the presence of risk-averse buyers. First, I provide conditions that guarantee that for the monopolistic seller the NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Second, I consider a more competitive framework where buyers with rejected bids have access to an alternative option. I show that if under the posted-price scenario there are unserved customers with low valuations, then NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Finally, I study whether adding the posted-price option to the NYOP will further increase the seller's profit and show that for the decreasing absolute risk-aversion utility and a monopolistic seller it does not. In the presence of an alternative option, the answer depends on whether buyers consider the posted-price option and the alternative option to be close substitutes or not. Adding the posted-price option will increase the profit in the former case and will not in the latter.

• 저널Marketing Science · 30(2) · 290–304
• 토픽Auction Theory and Applications · Management Science and Operations Research
• DOI10.1287/mksc.1100.0622
• 저자Dmitry Shapiro