Bank Dependence and Bank Financing in Corporate M&A

We examine the valuation impact of bank-financed mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and the loan contracts used to finance M&A transactions, focusing on the difference between bank-dependent acquirers and other acquirers. We find that bank-financed deals have higher acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns relative to other cash M&A deals, but this certification effect exists only for bank-dependent acquirers. Despite bank-dependent acquirers being more susceptible to hold-up, banks do not impose higher loan pricing or more stringent nonprice terms on them. After completion of the acquisition, bank-dependent acquirers retain the M&A financing banks for a much larger share of their borrowing needs, suggesting the importance of repeat business for lack of hold-up. Our findings highlight the positive aspects of bank dependence and the importance of implicit contracting for the lack of hold-up in lending markets. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

• 저널Management Science · 68(3) · 2250–2283
• 토픽Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Finance
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2020.3947
• 저자Sheng Huang, Ruichang Lu, Anand Srinivasan