Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study

Private and public organizations are interested in finding effective ways to reduce crime and promote ethical behavior without investing heavy resources into monitoring and compliance. In this paper, we experimentally study how revealing different information about a fine distribution affects deterrence of an undesirable behavior. We use a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method to observe subjects lying (the undesirable behavior) and quantify the extent to which this behavior responds to information structures. We find that punishment schemes that communicate only partial information (the minimum fine in particular) are more effective than full information schemes at deterring lying. We explore the mechanism driving this result and link it to subjects’ beliefs about their own versus the average expected fine in treatments with partial information. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

• 저널Management Science · 68(5) · 3573–3589
• 토픽Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Safety Research
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036
• 저자Marina Agranov, Anastasia Buyalskaya