Impact of channel structure on a manufacturer's bundling decision with an application to digital goods

This paper studies the impact of channel structure on an upstream manufacturer's bundling incentive, with a focus on the implications of channel structure for bundling digital goods. We consider a distribution channel with a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces two products and sells them either separately or in the form of bundles to end consumers through a downstream retailer. Our analysis reveals that a manufacturer may have a stronger incentive to bundle when selling through a downstream retailer than when selling directly to consumers. Bundling serves as a tool for the manufacturer to reduce the harm associated with the well‐documented double marginalization problem. Therefore, our paper provides a new rationale to the bundling literature, which has traditionally focused on the role of bundling in helping a firm price‐discriminate consumers or gain competitive advantages against peer firms. Further, contrary to the conventional wisdom that asymmetries in bundled products hurt a firm's bundling incentive, we show that asymmetries can strengthen the manufacturer's incentive to bundle in a distribution channel. We also find that, as the marginal production costs decrease, a decentralized channel structure is more likely to lead to manufacturer bundling than a centralized one. Our results help explain the prevalence of bundling, especially digital products, in practice.

• 저널Production and Operations Management · 31(4) · 1679–1697
• 토픽Digital Platforms and Economics · Strategy and Management
• DOI10.1111/poms.13638
• 저자Qingning Cao, Xianjun Geng, Jun Zhang