Bank Regulatory Capital Arbitrage: Evidence from Housing Overappraisals

The overstatement of asset collateral values reduces bank capital requirements. We identify this novel form of regulatory arbitrage by studying housing overappraisals, the difference between housing collateral values computed by appraisers and actual transaction prices. We leverage granular loan-level data from Spain and a kink in the scheme of residential mortgage risk weights to show that tighter regulatory requirements cause larger overappraisals. This bias depends on the relationship between appraisers and banks; appraisers inflate mortgage collateral values only for their major customer banks. On average, overappraisals lower risk-weighted mortgages by 9%. Mortgage overappraisals allow banks to free up regulatory capital to support additional risk-taking in the corporate loan market. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4805 .

• 저널Management Science · 70(4) · 2255–2271
• 토픽Housing Market and Economics · Economics and Econometrics
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2023.4805
• 저자Sergio Mayordomo, Omar Rachedi, María Rodríguez‐Moreno