Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying

We show that public charities with corporate directors on their boards are more likely to lobby on behalf of connected corporate interests. We document this result using granular fixed effects and alternative measures, excluding donor firms, focusing on specific legislation bills, and shocks to board connections. The effects of connections are stronger when firms face more competition, have better corporate governance, and are more exposed to political risks. Through connected charity lobbying, firms enjoy political benefits in the form of governmental procurement contracts. Policies aimed at improving the transparency of nonprofits help discipline charities who would otherwise seek funding benefits through procorporate lobbying activities. Our results highlight directors’ charitable engagement as a complementary avenue for corporate political activities. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00165 .

• 저널Management Science · 71(12) · 10556–10578
• 토픽Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Strategy and Management
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2023.00165
• 저자Changhyun Ahn, Joel F. Houston, Sehoon Kim