Counter-orchestration in Platform Ecosystems: How Complementors Forced Apple to Change Platform Rules

When platform owners wield substantial market power, the rules they set often impose unfavorable terms on app developers while restricting their ability to push back through conventional market channels. But platform owners remain vulnerable to challenges from beyond the market. Drawing on a 15-year historical analysis of Apple’s iOS ecosystem (2009–2024), this study explains how large complementors such as Spotify and Epic Games used nonmarket strategies—public advocacy, litigation, and coalition-building—to pressure Apple into changing platform rules, including adaptations to the infamous “Apple tax” and anti-steering provisions. We identify three interlinked mechanisms through which these “complementor giants” orchestrate change: They create public opportunities for stakeholders to voice concerns, generate confluence across separate grievances, and render tensions salient. Together, these mechanisms invite legitimizing responses from regulators, media, users, other developers, and even the platform owner itself. Over time, these dynamics build sustained pressure and momentum for rule change. For practitioners, the findings suggest that complementors in concentrated platform markets may need to look beyond market tactics and invest in carefully designed nonmarket campaigns. For policymakers, the study suggests that rather than prescribing platform owner behavior, regulation could focus on strengthening the conditions under which complementors can advocate for themselves.

• 저널Information Systems Research
• 토픽Digital Platforms and Economics · Strategy and Management
• DOI10.1287/isre.2023.0491
• 저자Thomas Huber, Thomas Kude, Jan Lepoutre, Julien Malaurent