ms·1974년 11월 1일
Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information
Joseph T. Howson, Robert W. Rosenthal
Management Science
31
피인용
1.7
FWCI
0
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 피인용
9
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 참고문헌
- 주제불완전정보 게임 · 의사결정분석
01Abstract
The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific “Selten model.” As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.
02연구 흐름
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03비슷한 논문
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04이후 연구
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05선행 연구
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06서지 정보
- 저널Management Science · 21(3) · 313–315
- 토픽Game Theory and Applications · Management Science and Operations Research
- DOI10.1287/mnsc.21.3.313
- 저자Joseph T. Howson, Robert W. Rosenthal