IS Atlas
ms·1975년 12월 1일

Duels with Continuous Firing

John Patrick Lang, George Kimeldorf

Management Science

21
피인용
56.7
FWCI
0
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 피인용
3
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 참고문헌
01Abstract

A game-theoretic model is proposed for the generalization of a discrete-fire silent duel to a silent duel with continuous firing. This zero-sum two-person game is solved in the symmetric case. It is shown that pure optimal strategies exist and hence also solve a noisy duel with continuous firing. A solution for the general nonsymmetric duel is conjectured.

02연구 흐름

불러오는 중…

03비슷한 논문

불러오는 중…

04이후 연구

불러오는 중…

05선행 연구

불러오는 중…

06서지 정보