IS Atlas
msom·2012년 10월 6일

Delegation vs. Control of Component Procurement Under Asymmetric Cost Information and Simple Contracts

Enis Kayış, Feryal Erhun, Erica L. Plambeck

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

139
피인용
8.3
FWCI
31
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 피인용
36
IS/마케팅/OM 탑저널 참고문헌
01Abstract

A manufacturer must choose whether to delegate component procurement to her tier 1 supplier or control it directly. Because of information asymmetry about suppliers' production costs and the use of simple quantity discount or price-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected profit for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to outperform control when (1) the manufacturer is uncertain about the tier 1 supplier's cost and believes that it is likely to be high; (2) the manufacturer and the tier 1 supplier know the tier 2 supplier's cost or at least that it will be high; (3) the manufacturer has an alternative to engaging the tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers, such as in-house production; and (4) the firms use price-only contracts as opposed to quantity discount contracts. These results shed light on practices observed in the electronics industry.

02연구 흐름

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03비슷한 논문

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04이후 연구

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05선행 연구

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06서지 정보