StableFees: A Predictable Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies must solve the problem of assigning priorities to competing transactions. The most widely used mechanism involves each transaction offering a fee to be paid once the transaction is processed, but this discriminatory price mechanism fails to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices. We propose an alternate fee setting mechanism, StableFees, that is based on uniform price auctions. We prove that our proposed protocol is free from manipulation by users and miners as the number of users and miners increases and show empirically that gains from manipulation are small in practice. We show that StableFees reduces the fees paid by users and reduces the variance of fee income to miners. Data from December 2017 show that, if implemented, StableFees could have saved Bitcoin users $272,528,000 USD in transaction fees while reducing the variance of miner’s fee income, on average, by a factor of 7.4. We argue that our fee protocol also has important social welfare and environmental benefits. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, Special Section of Management Science: Blockchains and Crypto Economics. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4735 .

• 저널Management Science · 69(11) · 6508–6524
• 토픽Blockchain Technology Applications and Security · Information Systems
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2023.4735
• 저자Soumya Basu, David Easley, Maureen O’Hara, Emin Gün Sirer