Organizing Data Analytics

We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00207 .

• 저널Management Science · 70(5) · 3123–3143
• 토픽Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Safety Research
• DOI10.1287/mnsc.2023.00207
• 저자Ricardo Alonso, Odilon Câmara