Integration of Primary and Resale Platforms

Consumers can buy concert tickets from primary platforms (e.g., Ticketmaster) or from consumer-to-consumer resale platforms (e.g., StubHub). Recently, Ticketmaster has entered and been trying to control the resale market by prohibiting consumers from reselling on competing resale platforms. Several states in the United States have passed or are discussing laws requiring tickets to be transferrable on any resale sites, worrying that platform integration—Ticketmaster controlling both the primary and the resale platforms—will increase ticket service fees and harm musicians and consumers. This article establishes a game-theoretic framework and shows that the opposite can happen: platform integration can lower the service fees in both markets, alleviating double marginalization in the primary market and benefiting the musician and consumers. Moreover, with platform integration, the presence of a small number of scalpers can counterintuitively reduce the ticket price and benefit the musicians and consumers. In addition, platform competition in the resale market may harm consumers. This article further shows that these insights apply in other markets (e.g. used goods, peer-to-peer product-sharing markets) and provides suggestive empirical support for the theoretical results.

• 저널Journal of Marketing Research · 57(4) · 659–676
• 토픽Digital Platforms and Economics · Strategy and Management
• DOI10.1177/0022243720917352
• 저자Tianxin Zou, Baojun Jiang